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Abstract
Open-world machine learning (ML) combines
closed-world models trained on in-distribution
data with out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors,
which aim to detect and reject OOD inputs. Pre-
vious works on open-world ML systems usually
fail to test their reliability under diverse, and pos-
sibly adversarial conditions. Therefore, in this pa-
per, we seek to understand how resilient are state-
of-the-art open-world ML systems to changes in
system components? With our evaluation across
6 OOD detectors, we find that the choice of in-
distribution data, model architecture and OOD
data have a strong impact on OOD detection per-
formance, inducing false positive rates in excess
of 70%. We further show that OOD inputs with
22 unintentional corruptions or adversarial pertur-
bations render open-world ML systems unusable
with false positive rates of up to 100%. To in-
crease the resilience of open-world ML, we com-
bine robust classifiers with OOD detection tech-
niques and uncover a new trade-off between OOD
detection and robustness.
1. Introduction
Open-world machine learning (ML) (Geng et al., 2018) has
been proposed to deal with arbitrary inputs to real-world
ML systems, which may not be drawn from the distribu-
tion used during training, referred to as in-distribution data
(Din). In this paradigm, out-of-distribution (OOD) detec-
tors (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017) are added to existing
supervised learning systems to detect OOD examples, with
classification outputs only provided for those inputs deter-
mined to come from Din, and others marked as anomalous.
Several OOD detection mechanisms (Liang et al., 2018;
Dhamija et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018) have been recently
proposed which exhibit good performance in certain settings.
However, they fail to test the resilience of open-world ML
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systems. For example, previous work typically uses only
a few OOD datasets to evaluate OOD detectors along with
a fixed Din and model architecture. Further, they only use
clean OOD datasets for evaluation without considering cases
when OOD data is corrupted or adversarially perturbed.
We seek to overcome this limitation and ask: how resilient
and effective are current OOD detectors? We categorize and
evaluate 6 key OOD detectors from top machine learning
conferences, in a unified evaluation setup which varies Din,
the OOD dataset, and the classifier architecture. We find that
the use of deep feature representations aids OOD detection,
but when faced with specially curated, diverse OOD data,
most OOD detectors we test have very high false positive
rates. We also test OOD detectors against images with 22
types of corruptions, which could either improve or decrease
the detection performance significantly. Built on our recent
analysis (Sehwag et al., 2019) of attacking the classifier
with OOD data, we finally propose a method to generate
OOD adversarial examples against end-to-end open-world
ML systems and demonstrate that it has a close to 100%
success rate in most cases.
Given this worrying impact of OOD adversarial exam-
ples, we integrate approaches for robust and open-world
ML to investigate how plausible the development of robust
open-world ML systems is. We adapt adversarial training
(Szegedy et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2018), a promising
approach for robustness against adversarial examples gener-
ated from Din, to work with various OOD detection mecha-
nisms. We show that while this approach has some promise,
it introduces a new trade-off between OOD detection per-
formance and robustness. We find it arises from a reduction
in the discriminatory power of robust features for OOD
detection.
2. Open World Machine Learning:
Background and Related Work
In open-world ML (Geng et al., 2018), inputs to the classifier
f(·) at test time is not limited to be from the same distribu-
tion Din used for training. They can be out-of-distribution
(OOD). To handle OOD data, an OOD detector h(·) is usu-
ally used to ensure that OOD data is marked as such and not
passed on the classifier. Here, we provide brief descriptions
of 6 state-of-the-art OOD detectors we analyze and critique
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in this paper. These represent a diversity of techniques
adopted to deal with OOD data, particularly regarding their
dependence on the classifier f(·) and need for representative
OOD data, either for training or calibration.
ODIN (Liang et al., 2018) (Depends on f(·)-Yes, Use of
OOD data-Calibration): This detector thresholds the max-
imum class-wise output confidence of a classifier and if it
is below a determined threshold, then the input is classified
as being OOD. The threshold may be determined with or
without the use of some OOD data. In addition, each input
is slightly perturbed to increase its predicted confidence and
the classifier’s output vector is temperature scaled.
Network Agnostophobia (Dhamija et al., 2018) (Depends
on f(·)-Yes, Use of OOD data-Training): This detector uses
the output confidence of a neural network trained with an
additional loss term which maximizes the entropy of the soft-
max output on OOD data. To perform this training, generic
OOD data is used during training (e.g., using CIFAR-100
when CIFAR-10 is in-distribution).
Mahalanobis Detector (Lee et al., 2018) (Depends on f(·)-
Yes, Use of OOD data-Calibration): Class-conditional Gaus-
sian distributions are first derived from the feature repre-
sentations of a classifier on training data. Then, for each
input, the Mahalanobis distance between the its features and
the nearest class-conditional distribution is computed. An
input with a Mahalanobis distance larger than the threshold
is inferred as OOD. Some OOD data is used for threshold
calibration and weights calibration for distance calculation.
Autoencoder Detector (Chalapathy et al., 2017) (Depends
on f(·)-No, Use of OOD data-None): A separate autoen-
coder is trained using the training data to minimize the
reconstruction error. OOD data is likely to have different
latent representations, which lead to larger reconstruction
errors as a sign of OOD. In this paper, we use the denoising
autoencoder structure used by Meng & Chen (2017).
Deep-SVDD (Ruff et al., 2018) (Depends on f(·)-No, Use
of OOD data-None): In this approach, a support vector data
description (SVDD) is trained on features extracted from a
base network pre-trained using an autoencoder. The SVDD
then bounds the in-distribution data with a hypersphere and
classifies inputs outside it as OOD.
Outlier Exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2018) (Depends on
f(·)-Yes, Use of OOD data-Training): Similar to Network
Agnostophobia, this detector also aims to improve the OOD
detection performance of the networks by explicitly training
on out-of-distribution inputs by adding an OOD loss term
(usually the entropy of the output probability vector).
2.1. Connecting robust and open-world ML
Our prior work (Sehwag et al., 2019) was the first to connect
robust and open-world ML through the introduction of OOD
adversarial examples, which were limited to inducing target
misclassification in the classifier. Compared to Sehwag
et al. (2019), here we (i) consider the effect of network
architecture and Din on OOD detection, finding a large
variation in the 6 detectors we test; (ii) consider far more
diverse OOD data, including corruptions and end-to-end
adversarial examples; (iii) combine OOD detectors with
robust training to reveal a tradeoff between OOD detection
and robustness.
3. Failure Modes of Open-World ML
Previous work proposing OOD detection techniques has
been limited in its evaluation. We analyze the resilience of
these OOD detectors to changes in the OOD data, model
architecture, and Din, finding a large variation in perfor-
mance as these aspects are changed. We then analyze the
robustness of open-world ML systems under 22 types of
image corruptions (Hendrycks et al., 2019) to OOD data
and end-to-end OOD adversarial examples.
In-distribution data: We primarily use CIFAR-10 as in-
distribution data for training (Din), given its prevalence in
previous work on OOD detection. We also report results
with Tiny-Imagenet as Din to evaluate the impact of Din.
Models: We use a Wide ResNet (Zagoruyko & Komodakis,
2016) with width and depth equal to 10 and 28 (WRN-28-
10) as the primary classifier. We also report results with
DenseNet-100, to evaluate the impact of model architecture.
Metrics: We report the false positive rate (FPR) to measure
the detection performance, which is the percentage of OOD
examples that are not detected. Following previous work,
we report our results with the OOD detector calibrated to
achieve a 95% true positive rate (TPR), i.e., 95% of in-
distribution data passes through the detector successfully.
3.1. Effect of OOD data
We consider 6 OOD datasets of two types. (i) Semanti-
cally meaningful OOD data: besides the public MNIST,
VOC12 and Imagenet datasets, we also use the Internet
Photos dataset (Sehwag et al., 2019) which contains 1000
distinct natural images from the internet using the Picsum
service (Picsum Authors, 2019) and was not used in previ-
ous evaluations of OOD detectors. We ensure the label set of
OOD examples is distinct from that of Din. (ii) Noise OOD
data: we construct Gaussian and Uniform Noise datasets,
consisting of random points in the input space. We scale all
OOD examples to the dimension of in-distribution data. All
results are obtained with 1,000 images from each dataset.
Use of classifier’s feature representations aids OOD de-
tection: In Table 1, we see that compared to Classifier-
independent detectors (Autoencoder and Deep-SVDD),
OOD detectors relying on the classifier’s deep feature repre-
sentations achieve much lower FPR values in general.
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Table 1. FPR (lower is better) of OOD detectors for 6 differ-
ent OOD datasets at a 95% TPR. Model: WRN-28-10, In-
distribution: CIFAR-10.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Imagenet Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 28.2 17.8 24.7 30.3 13.3 12.1
Network Agnostophobia 15.6 25.3 22.2 14.0 0.0 0.0
Mahalanobis Detector 8.9 10.8 7.3 76.5 0.0 0.0
Autoencoder Detector 0.0 56.1 53.5 93.6 0.0 0.0
Deep-SVDD 59.8 51.6 58.6 97.9 18.4 0.0
Outlier Exposure 18.5 23.4 31.1 24.6 0.0 0.0
Table 2. FPR of OOD detectors using the DenseNet architecture.
Model: DenseNet-100, In-distribution: CIFAR-10. Autoencoder
and Deep-SVDD are independent of the classifier used, so have
the same performance as in Table 1.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Imagenet Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 6.0 24.9 29.2 41.5 9.9 53.3
Network Agnostophobia 39.3 28.6 25.8 25.3 0.0 0.0
Mahalanobis Detector 23.0 10.9 8.3 73.9 0.0 0.0
Outlier Exposure 21.7 32.1 36.6 32.3 99.5 85.7
Detectors fail on diverse OOD data: The Internet Photos
dataset demonstrates the pitfalls of relying only on limited
datasets to evaluate the performance of OOD detectors. The
Mahalanobis detector outperforms the other detectors on
most OOD data except for the Internet Photos data, where it
has a very high FPR, making it unusable at 95% TPR.
3.2. Effect of model architecture
Change in model architecture can cause drastic perfor-
mance dips: As shown in Table 2, by using DenseNet-100,
ODIN achieves lower FPR on MNIST and Gaussian Noise
but higher FPR on other datasets. For Network Agnostopho-
bia, Mahalonobis detector, and Outlier Exposure, the OOD
detection performance gets worse. Outlier Exposure even
has the FPR higher than 85% on Noise OOD data.
3.3. Effect of Din
We use Tiny-Imagenet as Din to study the impact of Din on
OOD detectors. Detailed results are in the Appendix A.
OOD detectors have poor performance with Tiny-
Imagenet as Din: We observe a drastic reduction in the de-
tection performance when we switch Din to Tiny-Imagenet.
Similar behavior was also observed in Hendrycks et al.
(2018). For example, with CIFAR-10 as Din, ODIN
achieves less than 15% FPR for Gaussian and Uniform
noise with WRN-28-10 model. However, when using Tiny-
Imagenet as Din, the FPR increases to 100%. We observe
similar phenomena for other OOD datasets.
3.4. Sensitivity to corrupted data
We measure the performance of ODIN and Mahalanobis
detector 1 under 22 distinct types of corruptions (details are
1These are chosen for having the overall best performance in
the previous evaluation.
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Figure 1. FPR for OOD detectors on corrupted OOD data
in Appendix B), which we categorize as Geometric, Blur-
ring, Noise, Photometric and Weather based on their salient
characteristics. Intuitively, we expect that any corruption to
an image would make it easier to detect as OOD, since the
corruption is unlikely to be encountered in sanitized Din.
Corruptions can increase or decrease FPR for OOD de-
tectors: Contrary to what would be intuitively expected,
OOD detectors have different detection behavior depending
on the type of image corruptions and even the OOD dataset.
Both detectors have considerable variation in their perfor-
mance with the addition of corruptions (Fig. 1). For the
Mahalanobis detector (Fig. 1b), Geometric and Blurring
corruptions increase the FPR by around 5× for VOC12 and
Imagenet while leading to a modest decrease in FPR for
MNIST and Internet Photos datasets.
3.5. Inducing targeted attacks in open-world ML
We now consider the addition of adversarial perturbations
to OOD data to induce targeted misclassification to entire
open-world ML systems and assume that the attacker has
knowledge of the entire system. The OOD detectors can
be represented as first computing a distance metric for each
input and then flagging the input as OOD if its distance is
larger than a preset threshold. The distance metric can be
prediction uncertainty, or Euclidean distance of the input’s
representation, or reconstruction error. Let Dh(·) represent
the distance computation function for the detector h. Now,
to achieve targeted misclassification T of an OOD input
x˜OOD, the attacker needs to solve the following problem.
min
x∈H
λ ·Dh(x) + `xent(f(x), T ) (1)
For our experiments, we use an L∞ constraint of 8. We run
Projected Gradient Descent attacks (Madry et al., 2018) for
100-1000 iterations and vary λ to report best attack results.
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Table 3. FPR/OW-TSR (lower is better for both) with OOD adver-
sarial examples generated with an L∞ constraint of 8. Model:
WRN-28-10, In-distribution: CIFAR-10.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Imagenet Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 99.6/99.6 73.1/58.4
Network Agnostophobia 99.5/99.5 96.3/96.3 97.1/97.1 99.4/99.4 45.8/45.8 35.6/35.6
Mahalanobis Detector 94.1/93.6 95.4/93.6 88.7/87.1 97.3/96.8 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
Autoencoder Detector 0.0/0.0 88.2/88.2 82.5/82.5 99.2/99.2 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
Deep-SVDD 100.0/100.0 99.9/99.9 99.5/99.5 100.0/100.0 99.0/99.0 59.6/59.6
Outlier Exposure 99.2/99.2 99.5/99.5 100.0/100.0 99.8/99.8 71.2/71.2 21.8/21.8
Table 4. FPR/OW-TSR (lower is better for both) with adversarial
data of OOD detectors with adversarial training for CIFAR-10
data for 6 different OOD datasets. Model: ResNet-28-10, In-
distribution: CIFAR-10.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Imagenet Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 65.6/3.6 46.8/21.7 49.2/20.0 55.4/29.3 32.0/7.2 49.6/9.4
Network Agnostophobia 50.4/12.8 63.4/46.3 57.3/39.7 58.2/47.2 10.3/9.5 0.1/0.1
Mahalanobis Detector 10.6/4.2 86.8/32.0 47.9/41.0 90.4/38.4 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
Autoencoder Detector 0.0/0.0 55.6/27.1 53.5/25.6 93.6/45.6 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
Deep-SVDD 100.0/15.3 97.6/48.6 96.7/41.5 100.0/52.7 100.0/34.9 53.4/26.9
Outlier Exposure 64.6/2.3 62.0/32.2 65.6/32.5 55.2/29.6 67.1/43.2 81.3/27.5
We also report the open-world target success rate (OW-TSR),
which is the fraction of OOD adversarial examples that
bypass the detector and achieve targeted misclassification.
Results: We present all attack results in Table 3. We can
see that OOD adversarial examples achieve both high FPR
and OW-TSR values (around 100%) in most cases. This in-
dicates the severe vulnerability of open-world ML systems.
4. Towards Robust Open-World ML
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) has been shown
to be successful in mitigating in-distribution adversarial
examples. Here, we study the impact of adversarial training
on open-world ML systems by considering a PGD attacker
with an L∞ constraint of 8 and the WRN-28-10 model.
Adversarial training improves end-to-end robustness.
As shown in Table 4, the use of adversarial training makes
attacks more challenging. We observe significant drops in
both the FPR as well as OW-TSR, compared to the setting
where a naturally trained classifier is used (Table 3).
Adversarial training reduces discriminative power and
leads to worse detection performance on benign OOD
data. We find that adversarial training does have a severe
deleterious impact on benign OOD detection (Table 5). In
Figure 2, we investigate it further by visualizing the last con-
volutional layer’s feature representations of both naturally
and adversarially trained classifiers with the t-SNE (Maaten
& Hinton, 2008) method. In Fig. 2a, Din (CIFAR-10) is
clearly separated from the other datasets. However, this
is not the case in Fig. 2b, where representations from Din
overlap considerably with those from OOD data.
Table 5. FPR of OOD detectors for CIFAR-10 data for 6 different
OOD datasets with adversarially trained models on unmodified
OOD data. Model: WRN-28-10, In-distribution: CIFAR-10.
Autoencoder and Deep-SVDD are independent of the classifier
used, so have the same performance as in Table 1.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Imagenet Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 77.9 65.3 72.8 70.9 99.9 100.0
Network Agnostophobia 55.2 61.4 58.6 52.9 0.0 0.0
Mahalanobis Detector 9.4 63.5 46.0 73.1 0.0 0.0
Outlier Exposure 71.9 68.7 68.6 57.6 93.7 99.9
CIFAR10
ImageNet
VOC12
Gaussian Noise
(a) Benign classifier
CIFAR10
ImageNet
VOC12
Gaussian Noise
(b) Robustly trained classifier
Figure 2. t-SNE visualization of embedding of the last convolu-
tional layer of WRN-28-10 trained on CIFAR-10.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have performed a thorough empirical anal-
ysis of open-world ML systems for unmodified, corrupted
and adversarially perturbed OOD data. We believe our work
provides a template for future evaluations of robust OOD
detectors and open-world ML systems and make the fol-
lowing recommendations. First, detector performance must
be checked across different network architectures and in-
distribution datasets. Second, OOD detectors must display
consistent behavior across different OOD datasets, as well
as corrupted versions of these. Finally, open-world ML sys-
tems must be designed to be robust to adaptive attackers and
must be evaluated on OOD adversarial examples.
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A. Tiny-ImageNet results
Table 6. FPR (lower is better) of OOD detectors for 6 differ-
ent OOD datasets at a 95% TPR. Model: WRN-28-10, In-
distribution: Tiny-ImageNet.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 0.0 86.4 88.7 100 100
Mahalanobis Detector 0.0 92.3 67.3 0.0 0.0
Table 7. FPR of OOD detectors for 6 different OOD datasets with
adversarially trained models on unmodified OOD data. Model:
WRN-28-10, In-distribution: Tiny-ImageNet.
OOD Detector MNIST VOC12 Internet Gaussian UniformPhotos Noise Noise
ODIN 100 88.9 90.6 100 100
Mahalanobis Detector 0.0 98.1 82.4 0.0 0.0
Table 6 and Table 7 present the detection performance of
ODIN and Mahalanobis Detector on both naturally and
adversarially trained Tiny-ImageNet classifiers. We find that
both detectors return very high FPR when using VOC12 and
Internet Photos as OOD datasets. We also notice that using
adversarially trained classifier leads to larger FPR values.
B. All corruption results
Figure 3 shows the detection performance of the ODIN and
Mahalanobis detectors on the natural CIFAR10 classifiers
with all 22 image corruptions. We find that certain corrup-
tions leads to higher FPR values: all geometric and blurring
corruptions increase FPR values for VOC12 or ImageNet.
On the other hand, noise-based corruptions have a tendency
to decrease FPR rates.
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mnist voc12 imagenet random 
 photograph
gaussian 
 noise
uniform 
 noise
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
FP
R
clean
rotation
translation
shear
scale
affine
(b) Mahalanobis detector (geometric)
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(c) ODIN detector (blurring)
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(d) Mahalanobis detector (blurring)
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(e) ODIN detector (noise)
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(f) Mahalanobis detector (noise)
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(g) ODIN detector (photometric)
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(h) Mahalanobis detector (photometric)
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(i) ODIN detector (weather)
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Figure 3. FPR for OOD detectors on corrupted OOD data, the first column is for ODIN, the second column is for the Mahalanobis detector.
Each row represents geometric, blurring, noise, photometric, and weather corruptions, respectively. Model: WRN-28-10, In-distribution:
CIFAR-10.
